

ZeroLock® **Enhancing VCF with Preemptive Security**

VCF Security: vDefend, Advanced Cyber Compliance (ACC), Live Patching

ZeroLock: Preemptive and Runtime Security for the Hypervisor

Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• vDefend operates at the network level and provides network traffic control.• ACC is focused on compliance rather than protection.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Operates at the host and hypervisor runtime level.• Provides preemptive and runtime security for the hypervisor itself.
Patching	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• vDefend's Distributed IDPS virtually patches guest workloads at the VM's virtual NIC. It does not inspect the hypervisor, leaving a visibility gap.• Live Patching is reactive; it requires a known CVE and a vendor patch and excludes DPUs and some VM types.• A VM escape that targets the hypervisor through device emulation or hypercalls is not inspectable network traffic, so vDefend cannot see it from the network layer.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A live ESXi exploit was demonstrated at Pwn2Own Berlin on May 17, 2025. Broadcom's patch shipped July 15. ZeroLock customers were protected the entire two months.• Preemptive zero-day protection on the hypervisor itself. Behavioral lockdown rules detect CVE exploitation at runtime.• Runs on the hypervisor and watches the host's own execution. A VM escape produces anomalous hypervisor behavior at runtime, and behavioral lockdown rules stop it without a known CVE or signature.
Ransomware Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• vDefend catches ransomware on the workload network. Fileless detection is limited to Windows guest workloads.• ACC provides recovery to isolated clean rooms after an incident. Clean rooms are expensive; they require additional hardware & VCF licenses as well as a segmented network.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Stops ransomware on the hypervisor in real time, including fileless and Living off the Land (LotL) attacks using native ESXi tools (openssl, rm, sh, Python).• Blocks the ESXi attack chain Google Mandiant documented in July 2025 against Scattered Spider in "From Help Desk to Hypervisor."
Hardening	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• vDefend's Distributed Firewall provides microsegmentation between workloads.• execInstalledOnly blocks unsigned binaries. It does not stop LotL attacks using signed native tools such as python, sh, nc, and openssl. VCF has no native MFA for SSH to ESXi.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MFA for SSH, dCUI, and CLI on the hypervisor, closing a significant gap VCF leaves open.• Behavioral detection of LotL execution on ESXi and runtime lockdown rules that block unauthorized config changes at the moment of execution.
Compliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• ACC and DISA STIG enforce ESXi configuration. They cannot see what a logged-in attacker actually does.• Drift is detected and remediated with periodic scans. These scans do not provide real-time prevention of active attacks.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Blocks malicious config changes at the moment of execution, eliminating the window ACC's remediation cycle leaves open.• Forensic-grade alerts with process, parent, and user context provide PCI DSS, HIPAA, and DORA audit evidence that configuration baselines cannot produce.• Satisfies runtime monitoring controls required by PCI DSS 4.0 (Req 10, 11.5), HIPAA §164.312(b), DORA Article 9, and NIST 800-53 SI-4 that configuration baselines alone cannot meet.